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We give the Shor-Preskill type security-proofs to the
six-state concatenated scheme. The (secure) modified Lo-
Chau concatenated scheme is reduced to the Calderbank-
Shor-Steane six-state concatenated scheme, which is then re-
duced to the (BB84-like) six-state concatenated scheme.
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Information processing with quantum systems enables
what seems to be impossible with its classical counterpart
[1,2]. In addition to the practical importance, this fact
has many theoretical and even philosophical implications
[3,4].
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [5{9] is one of the
most important and interesting quantum information
processings. QKD seems to become the rst practical
quantum information processor [10]. Although security
of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD scheme [5]
had been widely conjectured based on the no-cloning the-
orem [14,15], it is quite recently that its unconditional se-
curity is shown [11{13]. In particular, Shor and Preskill
[13] showed the security of BB84 scheme by elegantly
using the connections among several basic ideas in quan-
tum information processings, e.g. quantum error correct-
ing codes (QECC) [16,17] and entanglement purication
[18].
The Shor-Preskill paper aords security for some spec-
ied (classical) error correction and privacy amplica-
tion methods for BB84 scheme [13]. For a chosen code
and a given error rate of the communication channels,
Alice and Bob can calculate Eve’s information on the
key. Alice and Bob would want to make Eve’s infor-
mation on the whole key less than what they regard as
negligible, for example, one bit. Alice and Bob can do
so by choosing an appropriate Calderbank-Shor-Steane
(CSS) code [16,17], for a given error rate. However, for
moderate error rates, it would be more convenient for
them to use simple CSS codes (for example, the seven-
bit [[7, 1, 3]] code [16,17] correcting single bit and phase
errors) in some cases since computations for the codes
are simple. However, the simple CSS codes will not able
to aord sucient security, that is, Eve would still have
non-negligible information on the key, unless the error
rate is very low. This problem can be avoided by using
the concatenated simple-CSS-codes. In the concatena-
tion scheme, already encoded bits are used as unit-bits
to encode new bits [20]. The itrative processes can be re-
peated as we like. The highly concatenated codes we use,
the less become Eve’s information on the key, if the error
rate is below a thereshold. Therefore, it is worthwhile
to make it clear that the concatenated scheme is also se-
cure (although the proof is quite straitforward.) On the
other hand, it has been shown that the six-state scheme
[9] is advantageous than the BB84 (four-state) scheme
in the respects of Eve‘s information on the raw bits in
the incoherent [9] and coherent attacks [21]. Recently,
the Shor-Preskill type security-proof was also given to
the six-state scheme [22]. It was also shown that the six-
state scheme is advantageous than the BB84 scheme in
the respects of the rigorous security-proofs [23]. In this
paper, we give the Shor-Preskill type security-proof to
the six-state concatenated scheme. Then we give the six-
state concatenated scheme and give Shor-Preskill type
security-proofs to the scheme.
In this paper, we use the same notations as those of
Shor-Preskill’s [13] except for that we omit obvious nor-
malization factors and that we use j0i and j1i, respec-
tively, instead of j+i and j−i. And we introduce a new
basis j0i = j0i + ij1i, j1i = j0i − ij1i.
Here we recapitulate the Shor-Preskill’s proof [13].
We give the scheme based on entanglement purication
that is known to be secure by the arguments of Lo and
Chau. Then we reduce the scheme to the scheme based
on Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes [16,17]. Then
we reduce the CSS-codes-based scheme to the BB84-like
scheme, completing the proof. Here we give a doubly-
concatenated scheme of the [[7, 1, 3]] CSS code that cor-
rects both single bit-error and single phase-error [16,17].
It is clear that the securit-proof can be generalized to
longer codes and more highly concatenated in the same
ways.
2 Modified Lo-Chau six-state (doubly) concatenated
scheme.
The first stage.
(1) Alice creates 2  72m EPR pairs in the state
j+i⊗[272m].
(2) Alice selects a random 2  72m-trit string t. She per-
forms nothing on the EPR pair for which t is zero. She
performs a unitary operation that transforms fj0i, j1ig
basis to fj0i, j1ig basis (to fj0i, j1ig basis) on second half
of each EPR pair for which the component of t is one
(two).
(3) Alice scramble the qubit pairs by a random permu-
tation pi.
(4) Alice sends the second half of each EPR pair to Bob.
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(5) Bob receives the qubits and publically announces this
fact.
(6) Alice selects randomly 72m of the 2  72m EPR pairs
to serve as check bits to test for Eve’s interference.
(7) Alice announces the permutation pi and the trit string
t, and which 72m EPR pairs are to be check bits.
(8) Bob performs the inverse of the permutation pi on his
qubits.
(9) Bob performs inverses of the unitary operation that
Alice has performed for each particle. Namely, he per-
forms nothing on the EPR pair for which the component
of t is zero. He performs a unitary operation that trans-
forms fj0i, j1ig basis (fj0i, j1ig basis) to fj0i, j1ig basis
on the qubits for which the component of t is one (two).
(10) Alice and Bob each measure their halves of the 72m
check EPR pairs in the fj0i, j1ig basis and share the re-
sults. If too many of these measurements disagree, they
abort the scheme.
(11) Alice and Bob make the measurements of σ[r]z for
each row r 2 H1 and σ[r]x for each row r 2 H2 on each
7 code-qubits they have. Alice and Bob share the re-
sults, compute the syndromes for bit and phase flips, and
then transforms their state so as to obtain 7m (encoded)
nearly EPR pairs.
The second stage.
(Here Alice and Bob do the same things on the 7m (en-
coded) nearly EPR pairs as they have done on subsets
of the EPR pairs in the step (11) of the rst stage. The
only dierence from the rst stage is that they are deal-
ing encoded bits in the second stage. That is,)
(1) Alice and Bob make the measurements of σ[r]z for each
row r 2 H1 and σ[r]x for each row r 2 H2 on each 7 (en-
coded) qubits they have obtained in the rst step. Alice
and Bob share the results, compute the syndromes for
bit and phase flips, and then transforms their state so as
to obtain m (doubly-encoded) nearly perfect EPR pairs.
(2) Alice and Bob measure the EPR pairs in the (doubly
encoded) fj0i, j1ig basis to obtain m-bit nal string with
near-perfect security. 2
Let us now consider the reductions of the scheme. The
same arguments used in Ref. [13] applies here: it does not
matter whether Alice measures her check bits before or
after she transmitts half of each EPR pair to Bob. Thus
we can assume that Alice measured the check bits and
syndromes before transmission of the qubits. The dier-
ence from the un-concatenated case is that they are to
measure the syndrome twice at both level of concatena-
tion, that is, un-encoded qubits and once-encoded qubits.
Then, it is straitforward to obtain the following CSS six-
state concatenated scheme.
2 CSS six-state (doubly) concatenated scheme.
The first stage
(1) Alice creates 72m random check bits and a random
2  72m-trit string t.
(2) Alice chooses 7m 7-bit string xi and zi at random
(i = 1, 2, ..., 7m).
(3) Alice encodes 7m qubits j00   0i using the 7-bit CSS
code Qxi,zi .
The second stage





(2) Alice chooses m 7-bit string x0i and z
0
i at random
(i = 1, 2, ..., m).
(3) Alice encodes each qubit jk0ii using the once-encoded






(4) Alice chooses 72m positions (out of 2  72m) and puts
the check bits in these positions and the code bits in the
remaining positions.
(5) She performs nothing on the EPR pair for which t is
zero. She performs a unitary operation that transforms
fj0i, j1ig basis to fj0i, j1ig basis (to fj0i, j1ig basis) on
second half of each EPR pair for which the component
of t is one (two).
(6) Alice scramble the qubit pairs by a random permu-
tation pi.
(7) Alice sends the resulting state to Bob. Bob acknowl-
edge the receipt of the qubits.
(8) Alice announces the permutation pi and the trit string
t, the positions of check bits, the values of the check bits,
and each xi, zi and x0i, z
0
i.
(9) Bob performs the inverse of the permutation pi on his
qubits.
(10) Bob performs inverses of the unitary operation that
Alice has performed for each particle. Namely, he per-
forms nothing on the EPR pair for which the component
of t is zero. He performs a unitary operation that trans-
forms fj0i, j1ig basis (fj0i, j1ig basis) to fj0i, j1ig basis
on the qubits for which the component of t is one (two).
(11) Bob checks whether too many of the check bits have
been corrupted, and aborts the scheme if so. Otherwise
they record the error rate.
(12) Bob measures the qubits in the (doubly encoded)
fj0i, j1ig basis to obtain m-bit nal key with near-perfect
security. 2
Then let us consider the reduction of the CSS six-
state concatenated scheme to the (BB 84-like) six-state
scheme. Here we can also observe that each zi and z0i
is not needed for Bob. Then we can apply the same ar-
guments used in Ref. [13]. The dierence is that we are
also to apply twice the reduction process involved with
Eq. (4) in Ref. [13] at both level of concatenation. Then
we obtain the following six-state concatenated scheme.
2 Six-state (doubly) concatenated scheme.
The first stage.
(1) Alice creates 3  2  72m(1 + δ) random bits.
(2) Alice chooses a random 3  2  72m(1 + δ)-trit t. For
each trit, she creates a state in the fj0i, j1ig, fj0i, j1ig,
and fj0i, j1ig basis, if the corresponding component of
the trit t is zero, one, and two, respectively.
(3) Alice sends the resulting qubits to Bob.
(4) Bob receives the 3  2  72m(1 + δ) qubits, measuring
each in the fj0i, j1ig, fj0i, j1ig, and fj0i, j1ig basis, at
random.
(5) Alice announces t.
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(6) Bob discards any results where he measured a dif-
ferent basis than Alice prepared. With high probability,
there are at least 2 72m bits left. Alice decides randomly
on a set of 272m bits to use for the protocol, and chooses
at random 72m of these to be check-bits.
(7) Alice and Bob announce the values of the their check-
bits. If too few of these values agree, they abort the pro-
tocol.
(8) Alice announces u + v, where v is a string consisting
of randomly chosen 7 code-bits (non-check bits), and u
is a random code word in C1. Alice announces the posi-
tions of the randomly chosen 7 code-bits.
(9) Repeat the step (8) at 7m times in total, then all
code-bits are consumed.
(10) Bob subtracts each u + v from his each code-bits,
v + , and corrects the result, u+ , to a codeword in C1.
(11) Alice and Bob use the coset of each u + C2 as the
key. In this way, they obtain 7m-bit string.
The second stage
(Here Alice and Bob do the same things on the 7m bits
obtained in the rst stage, as they have done on subsets
of the bits in the steps (8)-(11) of the rst stage. The
only dierence from the rst stage is that they are deal-
ing encoded bits in the second stage. That is,)
(1) Alice announces u + v, where v is a string consisting
of randomly chosen 7 code-bits, and u is a random code
word in C1. Alice announces the positions of the ran-
domly chosen 7 code-bits.
(2) Repeat the step (1) at m times in total, then all code-
bits are consumed.
(3) Bob subtracts each u + v from his each code qubits,
v + , and corrects the result, u+ , to a codeword in C1.
(4) Alice and Bob use the coset of each u+C2 as the key.
In this way, they obtain m bit key. 2
We have given the Shor-Preskill type security-proof for
the concatenated six-state QKD scheme. It is clear that
similiar Shor-Preskill type proof can be given to the con-
catenated BB84 scheme. The concatenated schemes can
be useful for the channel with moderate error rates. It
is interesting to note that concatenation structures are
perserved during the succesive reductions of the schemes.
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